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NOW TAKING THE FIELD, THE STATE GOVERNMENT:
LANDMARK STATUS OF BASEBALL STADIUMS AS
REGULATORY TAKINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
What if I said that a place that is revered by many-a place that has
moved millions to tears of joy and pangs of heartache-no longer exists?
Every few years, a memorable historic stadium is demolished to make way
for a new luxury venue that a team can call home. Yet, for many fans, the
modem stadiums lack the charm of the old ballparks. Fans see these
replacements as crimes against their cultural history. Communities
confront stadium proposals with cries to protect the aging giants. But,
there are tremendous costs involved with historic preservation, especially
the protection of sports facilities, which stand in contrast to the costs
associated with preservation of residential or commercial buildings. Some
ballparks' existence relies on the landmark designations implemented to
protect them.
In 2004, the City of Chicago granted local landmark status to Wrigley
Field' against the wishes of the Chicago Cubs 2 and Major League
Baseball's Commissioner, Bud Selig.3 The designation uniquely allowed
for some expansion of the stadium, while protecting a majority of Wrigley
Field's distinctive characteristics.4 Nonetheless, the team and the city
remain at odds regarding the landmark designation and the Cubs' attempts
to renovate and improve Wrigley Field.
In 2007, when Sam Zell purchased the Tribune Company (owner of
1. Fran Spielman, City Makes Wrigley Landmark, Allows 200 More Seats, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2004, at 20 [hereinafter Spielman, City Makes].
2. Sabrina L. Miller, Landmark Urged for Parts of Wrigley, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2003, at
Metro N 16 ("The Cubs organization has long opposed landmark designation for Wrigley
Field .... ).
3. Fran Spielman, Selig Delivers His Pitch for Wrigley, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at
93 [hereinafter Spielman, Selig Delivers] ("'[W]hile done in the spirit of preservation, [landmark
designation] will likely precipitate the loss of Wrigley Field .... It will be the first step toward
the ultimate loss of the ballpark."').
4. Spielman, City Makes, supra note 1.
5. Miller, supra note 2 ("The Cubs organization has long opposed landmark designation for
Wrigley Field .... ).
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the Cubs and Wrigley Field), he announced an intention to sell the team
and its historic ballpark.6 However, the landmark designation of Wrigley
Field complicated and delayed the sales.7 Potential buyers are hesitant to
deal with a potentially worthless property, be it a stadium without a home
team or a team without a viable stadium.
8
Much of the complication hinges on the interpretation of
constitutional law regarding takings. The Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 9 The Fourteenth Amendment
mirrors the Fifth Amendment and extends the same protections against
state action.10 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, a
Supreme Court case on landmark designations as takings,1" is a key
precedential decision. Arguably, the landmark status of Wrigley Field does
not fall within the permissible landmark designations set forth in Penn
Central.'2 Therefore, such a landmark designation constitutes a regulatory
taking by the City of Chicago and violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Alternatively, should the Wrigley Field owner challenge the landmark
designation in court, the court should consider baseball stadiums and their
distinctive properties unique so that, even if Penn Central controlled, the
landmark designation of Wrigley Field should nonetheless be considered a
regulatory taking.13
Additionally, issues arise regarding the standards of landmark
6. Scott Merkin, Selig Speaks on Sale of Cubs, CUBS.COM: NEWS, Apr. 2, 2007,
http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20070402&contentid= 1875509&vkey=news
chc&fext=-.jsp&c-id=chc.
7. See Michael Oneal, Potential Wrigley Purchase by State Holds up Cubs Sale,
CHICAGOTRIBUNE.COM, Dec. 21, 2007, http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-
fri-wrigley_122ldec2,0,4672721.story ("Sam Zell, Tribune Co.'s new chairman and chief
executive, indicated Thursday he's serious enough about trying to sell historic Wrigley Field to
the Illinois State Facilities Authority that he's holding up the sale of the Chicago Cubs to see if
the concept has legs."); see also Carrie Muskat, Wrigley Field Back on the Market, MLB.COM:
NEWS, June 10, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=200806 10&content-id=2881746&vkey-news mlb&fe
xt=.jsp&cid=mlb (stating that the sale of the Cubs would have to be delayed until after a
determination of a possible acquisition of Wrigley Field by the state).
8. Mike Colias & Ann Saphir, Zell's Mean Curveball; Potential Cubs Owners Are Steaming
Over Plan to Sell Stadium to State, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Feb. 4, 2008, at 2 ("'There's no question
this (stadium deal) would take away some luster for bidders[.]'").
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. See id.
13. See id.
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classification and the subjective qualities courts use to determine such
classifications. These issues lead to questions regarding the quality of the
current precedential system. Nonetheless, without a successful challenge to
the landmark status of Wrigley Field, the designation will have numerous
implications on the sale of the Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field.'
4
Part II of this Comment gives the historical background of Wrigley
Field, including its cultural importance, the business considerations of the
aging stadium, and the legal issues that have arisen in its ninety-plus years
of existence. Part II also chronicles the designation of Wrigley Field as a
Chicago landmark and examines the stadium's disrepair. Finally, Part II
discusses the Tribune Company's fundraising attempts and its impending
sale of the Cubs and Wrigley Field. Part III provides the history of
regulatory takings and the current statutory and case law that creates the
modem takings jurisprudence. Part IV applies Penn Central and
subsequent cases to the Wrigley Field analysis to determine whether a
taking has occurred. Part V states that the government should provide just
compensation regardless of whether the landmark designation satisfied
previous standards due to the unique nature of stadiums and the burdens
that a landmark designation imposes on them. Finally, Part VI concludes
with a discussion of the landmark status' effect on the sale of the Cubs and
Wrigley Field, and looks at two other stadiums that landmark laws greatly
affect. "
14. See Phil Rosenthal et al., On the Future, Dealmaking and Bad Press, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4,
2007, at News C1 ("On the issue of the sale of the Chicago Cubs, Zell confirmed that he may
seek to sell Wrigley Field separately. He acknowledged that Wrigley, because of its landmark
status, is a tricky, single-use piece of property.").
15. Federal landmark designations require owner approval, making a "takings" argument by
the federal government under the Fifth Amendment a nonissue. See infra Part Vt. Additionally,
a takings argument might not be the only assertion the Cubs could make under the Fourteenth
Amendment against Chicago's landmark designation. "Sign control ordinances are particularly
susceptible to First Amendment attacks" in regards to aesthetic-based regulation, JULIAN
CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW 557 (2d ed. 2007), a key justification of landmark preservation laws. See
Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131-32 (stating that landmark laws exist to preserve a historic or
aesthetic interest within a city). However, this is beyond the scope of this Comment.
2009]
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II. WRIGLEY FIELD
A. Birth of "The Friendly Confines ,16
Wrigley Field was built in 1914 on the grounds of a former seminary,
at the comer of Addison and Clark in the community of Lakeview, now
affectionately known as "Wrigleyville." 17 Originally known as Weeghman
Park, Wrigley Field housed Federal League baseball from its inception
until the league folded in 1915.18 In response to the league folding, Charles
Weeghman purchased the National League's Cubs and moved the team
into his new ballpark. 19 In 1920, Weeghman sold the team to the Wrigley
family, and the field was subsequently renamed Wrigley Field in 1926.20
Over the next seventy-five years, many of Wrigley Field's unique
characteristics took shape. 21 For instance, in 1937, Bill Veeck, a Cubs
executive who would later own the Cleveland Indians, planted ivy at the
base of the distinctive brick outfield wall.22  This same year, the Cubs
installed the original manual scoreboard and constructed the outfield
bleachers.23
In 1968, a Wrigley Company stockholder unsuccessfully sued Philip
K. Wrigley for his refusal to install stadium lights to facilitate night games,
which were standard throughout the major leagues.24 Thereafter, not much
occurred in Wrigleyville until 1981 when the Tribune Company purchased
the Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field from the Wrigley family and began
16. "The Friendly Confines" was a nickname given to the stadium by Cubs Hall of Fame
shortstop Ernie Banks. In 1985, the National Park Service conducted a theme study on
recreational facilities and their qualifications as federal landmarks. See generally JAMES H.
CHARLETON, NAT'L PARK SERV.: DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECREATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK THEME STUDY 23-32 (1986) (providing a general
overview of Wrigley Field's characteristics and history before the lights).
17. Wrigley Field History, CUBS.COM: BALLPARK,
http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/chc/ballpark/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 8, 2009); see generally Chi.
Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (I11. 1985) (providing a basic
description of the location of Wrigley Field, as well as the nature of the surrounding
neighborhood and inhabitants); CHARLETON, supra note 16, at 23-32.






24. See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (111. 1968) (deciding a stockholder
did not have the right to sue a majority owner for negligence and mismanagement comparable to
other industry members).
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renovations to the old ballpark, which included adding lights. 25  The
Tribune Company created new administrative offices behind home plate
26 adtoand remodeled the clubhouses throughout the off-seasons. In addition,
the Tribune Company added or remodeled elevators, private boxes, and
press and broadcasting booths2 7
B. The Light Fight and the Start of the Cubs' Battle with the Tribune
Company
From 1914 to 1988, Wrigley Field fans witnessed hundreds of
baseball's most memorable moments, including Babe Ruth's purported
"called shot" during the 1936 World Series.28  However, the Tribune
Company-owned Cubs began to encounter opposition from the community
and the City of Chicago about the addition of lights, setting the stage for
multiple other spats between the two sides.29 In 1985, the Tribune
Company and the Cubs sought to enjoin the Governor of Illinois from
enforcing an amendment to a local ordinance that effectively outlawed
night baseball at Wrigley Field.30  The court found the provision valid,
forcing the Cubs to negotiate with the city to repeal the ordinance. 3' The
Cubs threatened to leave Chicago-or at least Wrigley Field-if they could
not reach a compromise.32  The Cubs claimed that without the lights (a
standard fixture in every other ballpark in the major leagues), the team
could not play night games, and it would not be economically viable to
continue playing in the old ballpark.33 During negotiations, the "Citizens
United for Baseball in the Sunshine (CUBS)," an organization composed of
local residents, staged heavy opposition that led to an advisory referendum
on the ballot, and voters overwhelmingly opposed installing lights at the
stadium. 34  Nonetheless, the Cubs organization was able to broker a
compromise with the city for a limited night schedule.35 With newly




29. James Strong, Neighbors Vote No on Cubs Lights, CHIi. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1988, at C11.
30. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (I11. 1985);
see CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §4.156-430 (2008) (listing the current ordinances regarding night
baseball).
31. Ted Bauer, A Brief History of Wrigley Field (Before the Lights), ESPN THE MAGAZINE,
available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/storyid=3518172 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Strong, supra note 29.
35. Bauer, supra note 31.
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erected lights at Wrigley Field, the Cubs played its first home night game
in August of 1988.36
The quest for an increased night schedule was one of the many
challenges the Tribune Company faced over the next ten years as it
attempted to keep Wrigley Field and the Chicago Cubs economically
viable. In 2000, as the Cubs organization was proposing adding additional
seating to the stadium, "[t]he Commission on Chicago Landmarks
[(Commission)] ... granted preliminary landmark status to Wrigley Field,
meaning the panel will review any proposals to remodel or demolish it."
37
This preliminary designation sent the city and the team scurrying to
accomplish their respective goals.38 "City Planning Department officials
want the special status conferred on the entire ballpark while the Cubs
prefer the designation of specific features, such as the distinctive old-
fashioned scoreboard, the ivy-covered outfield walls and the neon Wrigley
Field sign on the park's exterior. ' 39 Landmark status would essentially
give the City of Chicago complete control over any proposed renovations.
Thus, the Cubs would be forced to negotiate with the City on the extent of
the landmark designation or force the Commission to apply a blanket
designation to the entire property through a public vote.4 °
During negotiations, the animosity between City Hall and the Tribune
Company emerged in the form of political maneuvering and verbal sparring
between the two parties. For instance, the City of Chicago and Mayor
Daley attempted to force the Cubs' hand by claiming that a parcel of land
adjacent to Wrigley Field, significant in the Tribune Company's proposed
expansion of Wrigley Field, was in fact owned by the city.41 Even though
the company had acquired a deed for the land and paid taxes for twenty
years on the property, the City claimed that this land was a street that was
never vacated, and, therefore, was not the previous owner's land to sell.
42
Since the Tribune Company's title insurance did not protect it from
36. Id.
37. Cubs, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at 3C.
38. Carol Slezak, Cubs Off-Field Strategy Not Winning, Either, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 1,
2002, at 103 ("But ever since the city announced its intention to make Wrigley Field a Chicago
landmark, the Cubs have scurried to expand the stadium's bleacher section-the idea being that
once the landmark designation becomes permanent, any changes to the ballpark will be subject to
approval by the landmark commission.").
39. Gary Washburn, Cubs Still Hoping for Landmark Deal, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 29, 2001, at
Metro N2.
40. Id.; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2.120-650 (2008).
41. Gary Washburn, City Throws a Curve at Plans for Wrigley, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 2001,
at Metro NI [hereinafter Washburn, City Throws]; Editorial, Stuck on First Base, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 4, 2001, at C20.
42. Washburn, City Throws, supra note 41.
LANDMARK STATUS OF BASEBALL STADIUMS
competing ownership claims from the City, Chicago's ownership of the
parcel forced the Cubs to work with the City over landmark designation
before it would negotiate the sale of the land.43 In addition, the Tribune
Company and the City began to exchange biting editorials, each claiming
bad faith by the other party.4 The battle intensified as the Commission on
Chicago Landmarks granted permanent landmark status to the stadium,
45
handcuffing future renovations to Wrigley Field, such as improvements to
the bleachers and increases in seating capacity.
C. Permanent Landmark Designation to Wrigley Field
In late 2001, the City of Chicago and the Tribune Company
tentatively agreed to a deal that limited the scope of the proposed
permanent landmark designation to include, most importantly, "the ivy on
the outfield wall, the scoreboard, the marquee in front, [and] the general
shape of the facility. 46  However, the Cubs' attempts to stall the
designation led the City to move forward without owner approval and left
the issue to a public vote.4 7 Even as the process continued without the
Cubs' support, the team attempted to delay every hearing and city meeting
at the price of leaving the proposed Wrigley Field renovations in a state of
flux. 48 Cubs president, Andy MacPhail, stated that the designation would
greatly hinder the Cubs' ability to keep Wrigley Field economically viable
and would ultimately lead to its demise.49
Major League Baseball jumped into the fray as well. Commissioner
Bud Selig wrote in a letter to the chairman of the Commission on Chicago
43. Id.
44. See Stuck on First Base, supra note 41 ("The city suddenly has great concern for the
interests of building owners who rake in some $7 million a year by holding rooftop parties on
game days ... [and] pay nothing for the entertainment that draws the rooftop crowds .... Mayor
Daley has decided that the Cubs are the enemy."); Alicia Mazur Berg, Letter to the Editor, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 19, 2001, at Commentary N22 ("[T]he Tribune accused the city of unreasonably
delaying the plans of its parent company to expand Wrigley Field. But the editorial failed to
acknowledge the role of the Tribune Company in creating those delays .... [T]he city can't
approve a project on the basis of press releases and newspaper stories.").
45. Nancy Moffett, Panel OKs Cubs Park as Landmark, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at
16.
46. Fran Spielman, Deal Struck on Cubs Park Landmark Status, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 5,
2001, at 3 [hereinafter Spielman, Deal Struck].
47. Associated Press, City of Chicago, Cubs Tangle Over Landmark Process, ESPN.COM,
Dec. 14, 2002, http://assets.espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/1214/1476921 .html; see generally CHI.,
ILL., MUN. CODE § 2.120-650, 670-690 (2008).
48. See Slezak, supra note 38; Cubs Landmark Hearing Planned, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2003,
at Metro SSW3 (providing examples of the Tribune Company stalling the proceedings).
49. Spielman, City Makes, supra note 1.
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Landmarks that "[n]o city in America has ever used a landmarks
designation as an effective means to preserve a ballpark... [and] while
done in the spirit of preservation, [landmarks designation] will likely
precipitate the loss of Wrigley Field., 50 The faces of the Cubs organization
at the time, players Kerry Wood and Sammy Sosa, also made statements
suggesting that Wrigley Field either needed an overhaul or should be
abandoned in favor of a new stadium.
51
The public, however, voiced its support for the landmark designation
as a means to protect the historical park that baseball fans had grown to
cherish.52 The Wrigleyville neighborhood was also behind the designation,
because without it, the rooftop bleachers' sightlines could be hindered if
the Tribune Company extended the stadium's bleachers.53 Additionally,
local concerns regarding crime and nuisances associated with larger events
led to more support for the designation.54 Landmark advocacy groups,
such as Landmarks Illinois, also threw their support behind the designation
in order to permanently protect Wrigley Field from possible destruction.55
With public approval being the bar for landmark designation, the city
council assigned a permanent designation to Wrigley Field.56 However, the
50. Spielman, Selig Delivers, supra note 3; accord Gary Washburn, Selig Opposes Wrigley
Field as Landmark; That May Bring Demise, He Says, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2003, at Metro SSW3
("Ballparks 'must be flexible to address the changing desires of fans if they are to remain
competitive[.]"').
51. Paul Sullivan, A Call for Change at Wrigley; Wood, Sosa Say Old Park Should Adapt
with Times, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 13, 2003, at Sports C6 ("'[I]f they want to make the ballpark better,
fans have to understand they have to make some changes,' Sosa said.").
52. See, e.g., Jay Mariotti, Standing Up to the Bullies, CHI. SuN-TiMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at
118 [hereinafter Mariotti, Standing Up] (stating that a move out of Wrigley Field would "kill the
inherent charm of the Cubs" and lead to "all those memories of yesteryear... vanish[ing]").
53. See Associated Press, Team Wants More Bleachers, Multi-Purpose Addition,
ESPN.cOM, June 18, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1824589 [hereinafter
Associated Press, Team Wants]. To note, some editorials and columnists attribute the bleacher
expansion as part of the bitter political battle between the Tribune Company and City Hall.
Likewise, Mayor Daley's support for the building owners and the lawsuits against them, which
disappeared after the landmark designation and preliminary expansions were approved, is also
attributed to this cause. Stuck on First Base, supra note 4 1; Berg, supra note 44; Mariotti,
Standing Up, supra note 52.
54. Associated Press, Team Wants, supra note 53. For instance, a 2008 Lake View
community survey regarding proposed weekend night games at Wrigley Field cited the need for a
greater police presence and traffic concerns. LAKE VIEW CITIZENS' COUNCIL, LAKE VIEW
CITIZENS' COUNCIL (LVCC) SURVEY RESULTS ON WEEKEND NIGHT GAMES AT WRIGLEY 2
(2008), http://www.lakeviewcitizens.org/files/WeekendWrigley%20090508.pdf (last visited
Mar. 8, 2009).
55. Wrigley Field, LANDMARKS ILLINOIS,
http://www.landmarks.org/ten-most_2008_1 l.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
56. Moffett, supra note 45; Spielman, City Makes, supra note 1.
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City allowed the team to add two hundred seats to the stadium 57 and
increase the number of night games from eighteen to twenty-two by 2004,
and to thirty by 2006.58
D. Falling Concrete and Chicago's Battle with the Tribune Company
The designation of Wrigley Field as a Chicago landmark did not end
the contentious relationship between City Hall and the Tribune Company;
it was just the beginning. Years after the Cubs first unveiled the plans for
stadium expansion, the team again tried to propose a new expansion of
roughly two thousand bleacher seats, despite opposition from the
community and the City.59  However, any expansion discussions were
tabled immediately upon reports to City Hall that concrete began to fall
onto the seating areas within Wrigley Field.60 Following this incident, the
Cubs installed safety netting. 61 Yet, questions regarding the safety of the
stadium were raised leading City Hall to lash out at the Tribune Company's
management of Wrigley Field with a vengeance.62
As the grievances aired out in public, multiple issues regarding the
stadium came to light. A 2001 report on the structural integrity of Wrigley
Field cited structural defects and hazardous conditions that required
immediate repairs.63 The report led to questions about whether the Cubs
made the recommended modifications,64 followed by discoveries that the
Cubs made repairs and changes without the proper city permits.65 While
the verbal sparring between Mayor Daley and the Tribune Company
57. Spielman, City Makes, supra note 1.
58. Wrigley Night Games Rise From 18 to 22, ESPN.COM, Feb. 16, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id- 1732756.
59. Associated Press, Team Wants, supra note 53.
60. Gary Washburn, Wrigley Faces Checkup as More Concrete Falls, CHI. TRIB., July 23,
2004, at News C l [hereinafter Washburn, Wrigley Faces].
61. Associated Press, Indians Expect DH to Recover by Spring Training, ESPN.COM, Oct.
6, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1896370. [hereinafter Associated Press,
Indians Expect].
62. Id.; Gary Washburn, Daley Won't Take Lip from Cubs; Mayor Fires Back After
Comments from Team Exec, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25, 2004, at Metro C3 ("Daley has criticized the
handling by the Cubs and Tribune Company of three incidents of falling concrete at Wrigley
since June.").
63. Fran Spielman, 2001 Report Found Wrigley Defects; Engineering Firm Said Stadium
Needed Immediate Repairs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 30, 2004, at 3.
64. Id.; Fran Spielman, Cubs: City Damaged Wrigley; Team President Says Portions of
Stadium "Demolished", CHI. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at 8 [hereinafter Spielman, Cubs: City
Damaged Wrigley] ("[Tihe Cubs made fewer repairs than the ones recommended in the 2001
report .... ).
65. Associated Press, Indians Expect, supra note 61.
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intensified, the City of Chicago imposed heavy monetary fines against the
team and required the purchase of retroactive permits.66 Even though the
team made the repairs necessary to keep the structure in compliance with
safety and landmark requirements, the City still cited those violations.67
Ironically, local politicians even went so far as to say that if the team was
to receive permission to add seats, it should completely rebuild the outfield
bleachers rather than remodel them.68 Commentators, including a former
deputy public works commissioner and the current director of the
Infrastructure Technology Institute at Northwestern University, also called
for the Cubs to replace Wrigley Field outright.69
Before Wrigley Field could be reopened, the State of Illinois and the
City of Chicago subjected it to a multitude of inspections.7 ° On the same
day the Cubs received approval to reopen Wrigley Field,71 Cubs President
Andy MacPhail accused the City of coming to "the stadium.., with
jackhammers and... 'demolishing significant portions' of the park.,
72
By the end of the 2004, city officials informed the Cubs that the
stadium needed a more permanent solution than safety netting, and they
voiced their displeasure that supplemental engineering firms had not
performed the requested tests. 73  As renovation attempts floundered, the
Cubs spent the next few years trying various ways to raise funds for
66. Id.; Jon Yates, City Says Cubs Closer to Getting Permits, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 2004, at
Metro C I ("Daley has repeatedly chastised the Cubs for the way the team handled the falling
concrete and for failing to obtain permits for repairs. At one point, he called the team's handling
of the matter a 'disgrace."'); Rob Olmstead, City Again Says Wrigley Is Safe, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Aug. 24, 2004, at 13 (attributing the escalation of the fight between the Tribune
Company and City Hall due to the Chicago Tribune's reporting of multiple scandals in the Daley
administration).
67. See Yates, supra note 66; CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2.120-910(1) (2008). Section
13.200-100 even makes exception to the requirement of city permits to maintain the structure in
the interest of public safety or historical preservation when given authorization by the permit
director. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 13.200-100 (2008).
68. Gary Washburn, Cubs Urged to Rebuild Bleachers; Alderman Cites Age of Stadium,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 2004, at Metro W3.
69. David F. Schulz, Replacing Wrigley Field, CHI. TRiB., Aug. 11, 2004, at Commentary
C25.
70. Jon Yates, City Sets Deadlines for Wrigley, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2004, at Metro C1.
71. Gary Graves, Wrigley Field Cleared for Use, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 3C.
72. Spielman, Cubs: City Damaged Wrigley, supra note 64.
73. Official: Cubs Need Better Plan to Fix Concrete at Wrigley, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2004,
at 7; Fran Spielman, Engineers Say Nets at Wrigley Should Remain in Place; Buildings Chief 'I
need to Convince Myself What They're Saying is Correct", CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at 8.
Even with the proposed study, the City was unhappy with the lack of a permanent solution. Gary
Washburn, City Urges Better Wrigley Repairs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2004, at Metro Cl. There
were also fears that more concrete could fall. Fran Spielman, Wrigley concrete OK for now; But
Engineers Say More Pieces Could Fall, Recommend Nets, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at 50.
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Wrigley Field.
E. The Tribune Company's Fundraising Efforts and Attempts to Sell the
Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field
Over the next few years, as the Cubs attempted to expand the Wrigley
Field bleachers, the Tribune Company looked for new ways to raise funds
as it faced financial difficulties from salary increases that outpaced revenue
from the small stadium. 74 As expected, the Cubs faced opposition from the
City and the public in its fundraising attempts. 75 "In 2002, Cubs executives
signed a deal with Sears ... to wallpaper the dugouts with [its] logo. [In
2004], the team added lighted signage under the scoreboard and along both
the right- and left-field upper decks that included advertisers ....,,76  But
the proposed installation of a rotating advertisement on the landmarked
brick behind the plate, common in almost every other stadium, led to the
opposition claiming that it would detract from the unique character of the
ballpark.77
The Cubs also could not benefit from the common revenue stream of
corporate sponsorship in the form of naming rights, which cost the team up
to $10 million in potential revenue per year.7 8 Although the stadium got its
name from its former owner, the chewing gum company of the same name,
the Wrigley Company does not use the field in any of its advertising, nor
does it pay the Cubs anything for the stadium name.79 Because the fagade
that welcomes Cubs fans to Wrigley is protected by the landmark
designation, the Cubs organization does not have the ability to alter the sign
74. See, e.g., Jim Kirk, Signs Pointing to an End of an Era; Ads May Hit Bricks Behind
Home Plate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2004, at Business Cl (discussing the revenue possibilities for the
Tribune Company from adding signage in Wrigley Field).
75. See id. ("It is likely to draw complaints from nostalgia buffs who worship Wrigley's
sun-splashed, ivy-covered outfield walls, as well as the familiar bricks behind home plate.").
76. Id.
77. Jay Mariotti, Wrigley Bricks No Place for Ad Space; Wrigley Field, Though Decaying
Like a Pair of Dentures, Remains Baseball's Most Beautiful Piece of Landscape, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at 159 ("Wrigley Field, though decaying .... remains baseball's most
beautiful piece of landscape. And why it would be the height of greed and arrogance if the
Cubs... have the audacity to install a rotating ... advertising board on the fabled brick behind
home plate .... The Cubs can't sell Wrigley's timeless charm in one breath, then tatter one of its
most distinctive, old-fashioned elements with a 2004 billboard.").
78. Mary Ellen Podmolik, This Field by Any Other Name... ; Would be Risky for Potential
Corporate Sponsors, Experts Say, CHI.TRIB., Mar. 4, 2008, at News C1.
79. See David Sterrett, Wrigley Unlikely to Pay for Name; Zell Challenge Aside, Gum
Maker Would Get Little from Cubs Tie-In, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Feb. 4, 2008, at 2 (stating new
owner Sam Zell called out the Wrigley Company for benefitting from free advertisements).
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to accommodate any other sponsor. 80 One of the only options the team has
to generate money via naming rights is to petition the Wrigley Company
for financial support for a distinction that the company already enjoys, a
proposal that the company would likely reject. 81 Additionally, other
sponsors would be wary to rename Wrigley Field because they may fear
the possible community and public relations backlash that could result from
renaming the park.82
Over the years, the Tribune Company began to suffer heavy financial
burdens, and in 2007, the real estate mogul Sam Zell bought the
company." To pay off a collection of debts the company had incurred,
Zell announced his intent to sell both the Cubs and Wrigley Field,
separately, if needed.84 Although Zell stated that he was "probably a good
enough real-estate man not to get left with the old maid, 8 5 even he
acknowledged that Wrigley is a difficult property to sell due to its status as
a single-use property. 86 Over the next year, Zell reiterated his desire to sell
naming rights to the stadium 87 and fielded a multitude of high-priced offers
to purchase the Cubs. 88 Additionally, he bartered a failed attempt to sell
Wrigley separately to the State,89 a deal which would have brought both
stability and its own share of burdens. 90 The pending sales have thus far
80. Podmolik, supra note 78 ("[L]everaging Wrigley will be more difficult because in 2004
the city granted landmark status to... the marquee sign at Clark and Addison.... limiting a
sponsor's ability to use[it].").
81. See Sterrett, supra note 79 ("[I]t makes little business sense for [the] Wrigley [company]
to pay millions of dollars a year for naming rights at Wrigley Field that probably wouldn't boost
gum sales."); Podmolik, supra note 77 ("'I don't even think of Wrigley gum when I think of
Wrigley Field[.]"').
82. Podmolik, supra note 78; Editorial, Take Zell, Tribune Out of the Ballgame, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at 33 (chastising new Tribune Company owner Sam Zell for suggesting the
sale of the naming rights of Wrigley Field).
83. Rosenthal, supra note 14.
84. Merkin, supra note 6; Rosenthal, supra note 14.
85. Rosenthal, supra note 14.
86. Id.
87. See Sterrett, supra note 79 ("Mr. Zell recently suggested Win. Wrigley Jr. Co. 'step up'
and pay for having its name on the ballpark ...."); Jay Mariotti, Don't Buy What Sam's Zelling;
Trib 's Owner's Talk of Unloading Wrigley to State and Profiting Off Naming Rights Show that
He Just Doesn't Get the Allure of the Cubs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at 59 (admonishing
Zell for suggesting selling the naming rights of Wrigley Field).
88. See generally Associated Press, Bidders for Cubs Narrowed to Five, MLB.coM: NEWS,
Aug. 26, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20080826&content-id=3370279&vkey--news-mlb&fe
xt=-.jsp&c-id-mlb&partnerldrssmlb [hereinafter Associated Press, Bidders] (providing an
update of the sale process).
89. Muskat, supra note 7.
90. See Colias & Saphir, supra note 8 (discussing the burden of being saddled with decades
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remained up in the air, and the landmark designation will have an effect on
the ultimate fate of these deals.91
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND LANDMARK PRESERVATION LAWS
A. Regulatory Takings Before Penn Central
Prior to Penn Central, takings jurisprudence was not based on the
Constitution; rather, nineteenth-century takings principles most commonly
invoked "state constitutional law, natural law, and common law," even
though some state constitutions did not have compensation clauses.92
Nonetheless, "state courts recognized [regulatory] devaluative takings to be
compensable [from] an early stage in American legal history. 93  Early
cases were more supportive of property owners by not requiring a complete
economic value and "award[ing] compensation for the taking of any
discrete property right. 94 Additionally, early cases did not distinguish a
difference between a regulatory taking and a physical invasion, regardless
of the size or effect of the government's burden on the property owner. 95 It
was not until 1870 that the Supreme Court delved into the realm of
regulatory takings, thereby echoing the previous state decisions that
supported compensation for devaluative takings.96 However, the Court
quickly made an about-face regarding devaluative takings,97 leaving the
regulatory takings doctrine for dead in the federal system until 1922.9
In 1915, the Court continued to ignore regulations that devalued
property, even when the devaluation was almost a complete deprivation.
99
of rent payments); Editorial, Home Field Disadvantage; Sam Zell's Scheme to Sell Wrigley Field
to the State is Nothing More than a Foul Ball that Benefits Only His Cash-Strapped Tribune
Co-at Your Expense, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at 36 [hereinafter Home Field
Disadvantage] (discussing the tax burden that could ensue from the proposed deal); Fran
Spielman, Wrigley Deal: Stability-But at a Price; It Would Keep Stadium Where It is, But
Taxpayers Would Pay More in the Long Run, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Feb. 29, 2008, at 12 [hereinafter
Spielman, Wrigley Deal].
91. Associated Press, Bidders, supra note 88; Muskat, supra note 7; Oneal, supra note 7;
Rosenthal, supra note 14.
92. Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1229-30 (1996).
93. Id. at 1259.
94. Id. at 1259, 1290.
95. Id. at 1289.
96. Id. at 1214, 1267-74.
97. Kobach, supra note 92.
98. Id. at 1285.
99. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-12 (1915).
2009]
246 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:233
The Court based this on the ground that the state was exercising its police
power to protect the health and safety of its residents.'00 However, in 1922,
the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon reintroduced the stance that
"a regulation [that] goes too far ... will be recognized as a taking."'' In
that case, the Court found a taking even though the statute only restricted
the petitioner from coal mining on his land.10 2 Nonetheless, the case was
mostly confined to its facts in regards to devaluative regulatory takings
until Penn Central.10 3  The aforementioned police power, in terms of
promoting the "general welfare," was the justification the Court used, in
deciding Penn Central, to validate landmark designation laws.
10 4
Pre-Penn Central landmark designation cases also supported property
owners. 10 5  In Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, New
York's high court ruled that a regulation under the same Landmarks
Preservation Act at issue in Penn Central constituted a taking. 0 6 The court
based its holding on the fact that the city attempted to force the owner to
retain the property in its current state even though the building was wholly
inadequate for its continued use as an office building.'0 7 An Illinois
appellate court, in Illinois ex rel. Marbro Co. v. Ramsey, reversed a
commissioner's denial of a demolition permit for a landmarked building,
drawing into question the commission's authority and the appropriateness
of continuing to protect a building falling into disrepair.' 0 8 These cases led
to the culmination of landmark preservation law and takings
jurisprudence.' 0 9
100. See, e.g., id.
101. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
102. Id. at414.
103. Id. at 414-15; see generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
104. Sara Jane Herrin, Comment, Historic Preservation in Illinois, 1979 S. ILL. U. L.J. 449,
452 (1979); Michael P. Morrison, U.S. Supreme Court Validates Landmark Laws, 67 ILL. B.J.
664, 664 (1979).
105. See, e.g., Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974);
Illinois ex rel. Marbro Co. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (11. App. Ct. 1960).
106. Lutheran Church in Am., 316 N.E.2d at 307, 312.
107. Id. at 312.
108. Illinois ex rel. Marbro Co., 171 N.E.2d at 247-48.
109. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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B. Penn Central and Subsequent Jurisprudence
In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City whether historic preservation laws, namely New York's
Landmark Preservation Law, constituted a regulatory taking under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 10 Penn Central, the owner of New York's
Grand Central Terminal, challenged the city's comprehensive landmark
preservation ordinance after the state landmark commission designated the
terminal as a landmark."' Under the state's landmark law, any alteration to
the exterior of the landmarked structure required pre-approval by the state
commission." 2  The burdened owner could, however, "transfer
development rights to contiguous parcels on the same city block."
' 13
Following the landmark designation, Penn Central entered a fifty-year
lease with a company that wished to construct a skyscraper in the airspace
above the terminal, which could have provided between $1 million and $3
million a year to Penn Central." 4  When the companies applied for
permission to construct the building, the commission denied the project
because it would damage portions of the terminal below, despite the fact
that the plans satisfied the local zoning ordinances." 5 In response, Penn
Central filed suit claiming that New York had "taken" its property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
6
Penn Central became the leading case regarding "regulatory takings"
(government intervention analogous to a physical taking by the
government) requiring compensation.' ' 7 Although no precise rule existed
as to whether the regulation was a taking, 118 the Court ruled for the city and
held that the landmark preservation scheme was acceptable in the factual
situation presented.' 19 The Court first delved into the justification for
landmark preservation statutes, stating that a "large number[] of historic
structures, landmarks, and areas [were] destroyed without adequate
consideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility of
110. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Ill. Id. at 115.
112. Id. at 111-12.
113. Id. at 113-14.
114. Id. at 116.
115. Id. at 116-17.
116. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 119.
117. Jerold S. Kayden, Historic Preservation and the New Takings Cases: Landmarks
Preserved, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 779, 779 (1995).
118. Id. at 124.
119. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.
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preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive
ways."' 120 Additionally, the Court stated that there existed a "widely shared
belief that structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural
significance enhance the quality of life for all,"1 21 specifically in the city
setting.
122
The Court reviewed three economic factors to determine whether the
regulation constituted a taking: (1) whether a physical invasion had
occurred; (2) whether the regulation resulted in a complete economic
deprivation; and (3) whether the regulation interfered with investment-
backed expectations.1 23  Finally, the Court analyzed whether the "state
tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or general
welfare' would be promoted,"'' 24 thereby satisfying the requirement that the
restriction was "necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose."'
' 25
Some commentators argued that Penn Central's attempt to invalidate
the landmark designation failed because of strategic blunders on its part
with regard to the economic aspect of the analysis. 26 However, previous
cases had found constitutional backing for private property owners in
similar situations.127 There was no contention that a physical invasion
occurred in this case, 28 and, seemingly, many of the concessions that Penn
Central made may have lead to its downfall. 29  Penn Central did not
contest that New York City had a legitimate purpose in protecting
landmarks, nor did it dispute the fact that the terminal remained "capable of
earning a reasonable return.'
' 30
120. Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
121. Id.
122. See id. at 109, 129 ("The city believed that comprehensive measures to safeguard
desirable features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety of ways ....
The New York City law is typical of many urban landmark laws .... States and cities may enact
land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and
desirable aesthetic features of a city .. ") (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 124; see also Kayden, supra note 117, at 780.
124. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928)).
125. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (citation omitted).
126. See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 117, at 780.
127. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127-29; see, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(providing constitutional support for regulatory takings that do not result in a complete economic
deprivation).
128. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 ("A 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when
interference arises from some public program .. ") (citation omitted).
129. Kayden, supra note 117, at 780.
130. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 129 (citation omitted).
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Also, the Court stated that investment-backed expectations were not
in the air rights above the terminal, but rather in the operation of the
terminal as a railroad station. 13' Even more damaging to Penn Central's
case were the transferable development rights (TDRs) afforded to owners
of the landmarked property.132 Due to the number of properties owned by
Penn Central surrounding the Terminal, the transferable rights were
valuable enough to "mitigate [the] financial burdens the law has imposed,"
specifically where a taking had not occurred.133  Penn Central's two
arguments that a taking occurred were seriously rebuked by the
aforementioned considerations.1 34  The Court rejected Penn Central's
request to have the parcel viewed as discrete segments prior to its
determination regarding whether there had been a complete economic
deprivation,1 35 though Justice Rehnquist dissented.
136
Penn Central also lobbied for the Court to recognize that an
incomplete diminished value of the terminal was a taking by itself, but the
Court refused to accept this as well. 137 The Court rejected the argument
that diminution of property value by itself was not a taking in the historic-
district setting, and should not apply in this situation because it applied
only to select properties.' 38 The Court contended that such a ruling would
undermine "all comparable landmark legislation in the Nation."'139  In
addition, landmark designation laws were distinguishable from "reverse
spot" zoning schemes because they "embodie[d] a comprehensive plan to
preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be
found in the city," thereby satisfying the rationale for landmark
preservation schemes. 1
40
Subsequent cases from the Court regarding regulatory takings provide
more protections for private property owners, yet Penn Central's
131. Id. at 136 ("[T]he law does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's
primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel .... [W]e must regard the New York City
law as permitting Penn Central not only to profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a
'reasonable return' on its investment.").
132. Id. at 137.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 119, 135-37.
135. Id. at 130 (.'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated.").
136. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 141-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 131.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 131-32.
140. Id. at 132.
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precedential value is not likely to dissipate anytime soon.' 4 1 Initially, Agins
v. City of Tiburon provided an outcome-determinative version of the
economic factors set forth in Penn Central, setting a two-part test that
determines that a taking has occurred when the regulation does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies economically
viable use to property owners. 142 However, in the recent case Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court stated that a determination of whether a
regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest cannot alone
result in a taking.'
43
Furthermore, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
acknowledged the possibility of another method for private property
owners to show economic harm is a taking, even without a complete
deprivation of economically viable use.' 44 The Court approved the Agins
test regarding to complete "denial of all economically viable, beneficial,
productive, or feasible use."' 145  Moreover, the Court suggested the
possibility of a regulatory taking even without complete economic harm by
engaging in an ad hoc determination of the economic factors affected by
the regulation.' 46 For the first time, the Court analyzed and questioned the
"parcel as a whole" rule it adopted in Penn Central.14  "Although the
Supreme Court [subsequently] rejected this view. . . , it has since been
championed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States."'148 The Supreme Court did not
review the Loveladies Harbor decision, seemingly satisfied with their
determination of the relevant parcel. 149  Finally, Lucas distinguishes
between regulations that protect society from nuisances and regulations that
141. Kayden, supra note 117, at 779.
142. Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138
n.36). However, "Agins fails to define exactly what is meant by economically viable use."
Kayden, supra note 117, at 780-81.
143. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005) (overturning part of the Agins
test by finding no taking by a rent control statute that did not actually lower gas prices, the
intended effect of the regulation).
144. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992) ("Such an owner might
not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged
time and again, 'the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and... the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly
relevant to takings analysis generally.") (citation omitted).
145. Kayden, supra note 117, at 781 (citation omitted); accord Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
146. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, 1016-17.
147. Id. at 1016 n.7, 1017.
148. Kayden, supra note 117, at 782 (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 782 (citation omitted).
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promote a benefit in the name of the state's police power. 50  The
distinction causes landmark designation laws to hypothetically lose the
protection of acting as an exercise of a state's police power as a
justification for enforcing the state's aesthetic-based law.'
51
Other cases have tapered the effect of the Penn Central decision.'52
Dolan v. City of Tigard and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
provide guidance regarding exactions in permits. 53 In Nollan, owners of
beachfront property brought suit to invalidate a condition in their land
permit requiring an easement across the beach for public access. 154  In
Dolan, a plumbing supply store tried to avoid dedicating a portion of the
property to improve the public storm drainage system and building a bike
path to comply with city restrictions. 55 In both instances, the Court found
that the conditions amounted to takings because the exactions did not
substantially advance the intended legitimate state interests.1
56
Specifically, the Court in Dolan implemented a "rough-proportionality"
test stating that the nature and extent of the exaction must be roughly
proportional to the state interest asserted.'57
Nonetheless, the Lingle decision narrowed Nollan and Dolan, and
recharacterized those decisions without disturbing their holdings.' 58 The
Court emphasized that the exactions would be a physical taking per se if
the government had just ordered the property owners to turn over their
property rights rather than make them a condition of the permit grant. 159
These rulings did not imply that there were no legitimate interests; rather,
the previous decisions were partially based on the fact that the exactions
150. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023-26.
151. See Kayden, supra note 117, at 782 (referring to a hypothetical hierarchy of police
power justifications set forth by the California Court of Appeal when determining if an inverse
condemnation regulation is a taking). The police power/noxious use justification is likely not at
issue with stadiums because landmark designation is not a regulation that deals with a public
nuisance; rather, it is based on historical preservation. But see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (showing a valid regulatory application of police power resulting in the
property owner's inability to use the property for its most beneficial use).
152. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
153. See Dolan, 512 U.S. passim; Nollan, 483 U.S. passim. But see Carlos A. Ball & Laurie
Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513,
1516-21 (2006) (criticizing the Dolan and Nollan decisions and the Court's inconsistent decision
regarding exactions in regards to takings jurisprudence).
154. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-28.
155. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80.
156. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-95; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-39.
157. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
158. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546-48 (2005).
159. Id. at 547.
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did not advance the same interests that would authorize denial of the
permits. Lingle's overturning of the Agins' "substantially advance[s] [a]
legitimate state interest" factor did not affect the previous decisions in that
sense, but altered the value that would be placed on the state's interest.
61
Two recent cases further shaped the Penn Central regulatory takings
doctrine. 162 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, a landowner acquired property
that was already burdened by a regulation designating certain portions of
the property as protected wetlands.1 63  The Palazzolo court made two
distinctions on the constitutional aspects of the case.' 64 First, the Court
ruled that passage of title from one owner to another with the burdening
regulations in place does not preclude a landowner from making an
otherwise valid takings claim.' 65  In addition, the Court stated that
"[a]ssuming a taking is otherwise established, a State may not evade the
duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token
interest."
166
The next case, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, dealt with temporary regulations that deprived
owners of complete economic value during the period the regulation was in
effect.167 The Court reasoned that finding a regulatory taking for every
temporary restriction would be a major burden on the government that
would be expensive, encourage hasty decision making, and create logistical
problems in applying a state's police power. 68 The Court also reaffirmed
its support for Penn Central and the "parcel as a whole" inquiry regarding
economic deprivation instead of "adopt[ing] per se rules in... cases
involving partial regulatory takings."'169  The Court concluded that a
temporary restriction of a fee simple interest was a "strand" in the bundle,
160. Id.
161. Id. at 547-48 (second alteration in original) (providing that the states' interests test is
no longer a valid takings test on its own and states' interests should only be a factor in one of the
four other categories, discussed infra).
162. See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
163. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614-15.
164. Id. at 629-31.
165. Id. at 629-30.
166. Id. at 630. This was not the case here, however. The landowner still was able to build a
substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel of land. Id.
167. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 334-35.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 326-27. Nonetheless, the Court did support consideration of the investment-
backed expectations and acknowledged that without "a 'complete elimination of value,' or a 'total
loss,' . . . the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central" would still be required. Id. at 330 (citing
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)).
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which courts must analyze as if it were merely a permanent partial
deprivation of economic value.1
70
In the most recent case, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., discussed
supra, the Court provided guidance for reviewing new cases.17' The Court
categorized takings according to whether a regulation results in: (i) a
permanent physical invasion;
72 (ii) a complete economic deprivation;
173
(iii) a condition on land use that goes beyond the regulation's design; 174 or
(iv) when it substantially impacts property interests without completely
depriving an owner of viable economic use.175 When the regulation does
not fall into the first three categories, the regulation must be analyzed under
Penn Central standards.1
76
C. Federal Laws and Statutory Protections for Historic Landmarks
In 1966, in the interest of promoting the national policy towards
preservation "for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance,"'177 Congress established the National Historic Preservation
Act (Act). 178  The Act's goal is to maintain objects of cultural value in
order to benefit the public interest. 179  In order to achieve this goal, the
legislature also enabled the Secretary of the Interior to "maintain a National
Register of Historic Places" to oversee the country's historic landmarks.'
8 0
Federal landmark law is not at issue in the case of takings, despite
landmarking's effects on economic value and transferability.' 18  Under the
170. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 342.
171. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
172. See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(stating that permanent physical invasions result in regulatory takings).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 123, 131.
176. Supra text accompanying notes 123, 131. The Penn Central analysis essentially has
been championed as the balancing test required to make a successful partial taking claim. See
Calvert G. Chipchase, From Grand Central to the Sierras: What Do We Do with Investment-
Backed Expectations in Partial Regulatory Takings?, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43 (2004) (reviewing
partial takings and the Penn Central balancing test).
177. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (2008).
178. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470(a)(2) (2008).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See generally NationalParkService.gov, National Historic Landmarks Program,
Questions & Answers, http://www.nps.gov/nhl/QA.htm#7 (last visited Nov. 30, 2008)
[hereinafter Questions & Answers] (explaining that landowners are able to prevent a landmark
designation by objecting to the Secretary of the Interior; therefore, designations only occur with
owner consent).
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federal standards, if a landowner objects to the landmark designation, the
Secretary of the Interior cannot designate the property.1 82 For instance, in
1986, the National Park Service conducted a theme study on recreation in
the United States and determined that Wrigley Field was eligible for
designation as a national landmark. 83 Nonetheless, because the owners of
Wrigley Field objected to the designation, the landmarking did not occur.
1 84
Federal laws also encourage states and municipalities to employ their
own landmark programs. 85 However, courts and commentators have been
critical of the standards of the municipal laws regarding landmarks.
86
They maintain that there is a lack of set standards among city landmark
procedures, which lead to differing and confusing laws countrywide.
87
Additionally, they argue that lax standards make it far too easy for the
public or municipalities to preserve structures with little to no historical
value, imposing a burden on landowners. 188 Finally, many of the decisions
regarding landmarked buildings are left to the subjective will of politicians
that may bend to political pressure.
1 89
In Chicago, the Illinois Municipal Code provides a right of landmark
protection and designation to the municipalities.1 90 The Municipal Code of
Chicago highlights certain distinct factors that affect the landmarking of
local structures. 91 For instance, the Commission on Chicago Landmarks
(Commission) consists of nine members, eight of whom the mayor
182. Id.
183. CHARLETON, supra note 16, at 23-32.
184. E-mail from Patty Henry, Historian, National Park Service, to author, (Oct. 20, 2008,
12:52 PST) (on file with author).
185. See Mark D. Brookstein, Note, When History is History: Maxwell Street, "Integrity,"
and the Failure of Historic Preservation Law, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1847, 1847, 1865, 1878-80
(2001).
186. See id. at 1847, 1873-76.
187. See id. at 1880 ("[I]f more concrete guidelines were developed, it would be easier for a
reviewing body to determine whether a local commission applied the correct criteria.").
188. See, e.g., Associated Press, Dilapidated Denny's Apparently a Historical Landmark,
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080321/newslzln2l nowread.html [hereinafter
Associated Press, Dilapidated Denny's] (discussing owners of a boarded-up, decaying Denny's
from demolishing the building).
189. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Marbro Co. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246, 246-47 (111. App. Ct.
1960) (reversing a denial of a demolition permit from a commissioner after delays were imposed
to allow the city to find a way to preserve the building); Landmarks Preservation Council v. City
of Chicago, 531 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1988) (deciding the case on standing grounds, but displaying
landmark advocacy groups' displeasure with decisions of the Landmarks Commission).
190. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/l1-48.2 (2008).
191. See generally, CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-120 (2008).
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appoints. 192 The Commission has the sole power to oversee applications
for alterations and any other work required regarding the landmarks, and it
also oversees the hearings and recommendations regarding landmarking
buildings within the city.' 93
When designating a landmark, the Commission must take into
account vaguely defined standards. 194 For example, a landmark location
must be a "site of a significant historic event which may or may not have
taken place within [the location]."' 95  Unlike the federal designation
process, however, the Commission need not consider owner consent in its
regulatory takings analysis. 196 Rather, the City may designate a landmark
and burden the property owner against its will merely by convening a
public hearing and soliciting a recommendation from the Commission.
197
Under these standards, the designation of Wrigley Field as a landmark
would be a regulatory taking pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. WRIGLEY FIELD As A REGULATORY TAKING UNDER PENN CENTRAL
Landmark preservation laws reflect a legitimate exercise of state
legislative power to promote the general welfare. 198 In Penn Central, the
Supreme Court established constitutional protections that guide and control
federal, state, and municipal historical preservation statutes. 199
Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding Wrigley Field's landmark
designation indicate a municipal regulatory taking, entitling the Tribune
Company and successive owners to "just compensation" under the
standards enumerated in Penn Central.
200
192. § 2-120-590 (2008). This, for instance, may be an example of the aforementioned
politicking that could go on under the guise of a landmark preservation scheme. See, e.g. sources
cited supra notes 43, 64.
193. § 2-120-610 (2008).
194. § 2-120-620 (2008).
195. Id.
196. Compare § 2-120-650 (2008) with Questions & Answers, supra note 181.
197. § 2-120-650, -670, -690.
198. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978).
199. See id. passim.
200. See id. According to the Court's recent reiteration, the landmark inquiry, while not a
complete deprivation but affecting primary investment-backed expectations, would be analyzed
under Penn Central. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
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A. Legitimate State Interests
In Penn Central, the Court refused to provide a rigid standard for
determining the invalidity of a regulation as a taking.201 Instead, the Court
provided different standards to help determine whether the regulation
effectively accomplished the goals of historic preservation. 2  One
justification for landmark preservation laws is that aesthetically pleasing
sites provide societal benefits.20 3 The Court in Penn Central made multiple
references to the benefits that landmarks provide to both the city and urban
204setting, including economic benefits, stimulation of business and
industry, and promotion of tourism.
20 5
Wrigley Field is located in a residential, almost suburban,
neighborhood in Chicago.20 6 Therefore, in suburban contexts, some of the
Court's justifications in Penn Central for the validity of preservation laws
in urban communities are lost.207  However, the Court also described
communal benefits afforded to the surrounding neighborhoods of
landmarked locations.20 8  Nevertheless, a recent Lakeview Citizens'
Council survey of community residents reflects the community's belief that
promoting tourism to Wrigley Field through weekend evening games
201. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
202. Id. at 109, 124, 129.
203. See, e.g., id. at 108. But ef First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1370 (1989) ("When land use regulations seek to
advance what are deemed lesser interests such as aesthetic values of the community they
frequently are outweighed by constitutional property rights.") (citation omitted).
204. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 109, 129 ("The city believed that comprehensive measures
to safeguard desirable features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens in a variety
of ways .... The New York City law is typical of many urban landmark laws .... States and
cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city .... ") (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 109 (reviewing the New York City statute that specifically evaluated the urban
qualities of the environment to justify the enactment of the statute and stating "the standing of
[New York City] as a world-wide tourist center and world capital of business, culture, and
government' would be threatened if legislation were not enacted to protect historic
landmarks ... ").
206. See Encyclopedia of Chicago, Lake View,
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/715.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008)
(discussing the history of the community, resistance to its annexation to Chicago, and the
previous fifty-year attempt to fight off urban development); see also Chicago Nat'l League Ball
Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ill. 1985) (providing a basic description of the
Wrigley Field location as well as the nature of its surrounding neighborhood and its inhabitants).
207. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 109.
208. Id. at 108-09.
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negatively impacts the neighborhood.2 °9
Despite Wrigley Field's negative effects on the community, many
local residents support the landmark designation, though not because of the
benefits that landmarking typically provides the public. 210  Rather, many
local residents support the landmark designation due to the economic
benefits it affords them personally.211 Since the designation prohibits the
Cubs from altering Wrigley Field, local illegitimate "rooftop bleacher"
corporations, for example, enjoy the benefits of professional baseball
without compensating the Tribune Company.212
Some sports economists contend that a ballpark's negative
externalities, such as crime and noise, do not injure the Wrigley community
because they have been internalized through reduced property values
caused by the minimal amount of original tenants around Wrigley.213
However, this theory ignores the increase in value of the property adjacent
to Wrigley due to these "rooftop bleachers. 214
Notwithstanding the economic benefits the ballpark provides for some
residents, the landmark designation fails to achieve its purported goal: to
"safeguard desirable features of the existing urban fabric., 215  By
supporting the landmark designation, Lakeview residents are able to stunt
the growth and expansion of Wrigley Field, 216 an urban vestige in the heart
of a residential neighborhood.
Arguably, the landmark designation also does not further legitimate
state interests, as Wrigley Field's landmarking may have been triggered
209. LAKE VIEW CITIZENS' COUNCIL (LVCC), SURVEY RESULTS ON WEEKEND NIGHT
GAMES AT WRIGLEY (2008),
http://www.lakeviewcitizens.org/files/WeekendWrigley%20090508.pdf.
210. See, e.g., Liam Ford, City to Mull Objections to Cubs Plan, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2001,
at Metro N4.
211. Associated Press, Team Wants, supra note 53; Associated Press, Cubs, Rooftop Club
Owner Reach Agreement Through 2023, ESPN.COM, May 4, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3380955 [hereinafter Associated Press, Cubs,
Rooftop Club Owner].
212. See generally Ford, supra note 210 ("Nearby building owners who have capitalized on
their rooftop views into Wrigley have said the height of the new [proposed] bleachers would
block... views into the park from the outside."); Stuck on First Base, supra note 41 ("The city
suddenly has great concern for the interests of building owners who rake in some $7 million a
year by holding rooftop parties on game days ... [and] pay nothing for the entertainment that
draws the rooftop crowds .... ").
213. MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 228 (2d ed.
2005).
214. See Associated Press, Team Wants, supra note 53; Associated Press, Cubs, Rooftop
Club Owner, supra note 211.
215. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 109 (1978).
216. See id.
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primarily by the feud between Mayor Daley and the Tribune Company.217
By applying a landmark designation, the City of Chicago acquired more
control over the property, creating a roadblock in the Tribune Company's
path.21 8 Despite their factual nuances and Lingle's modification of
"legitimate state actions," Nollan and Dolan, for example, imposed
heightened pressure on the government to show a connection between the
legitimate state interest and the regulation.219 If this standard is applied to
Wrigley's landmark designation, Mayor Daley's questionable intent could
lend support for a takings finding.220 Additionally, the City's attempt to
force the Cubs' hand by withholding property surrounding the stadium
thought to be owned by the Cubs could be an act of bad faith.22' This is
especially true if the tax issues related to the property were not settled with
the team and if the City was unfairly and arbitrarily singling the team out in
this designation.222
B. Economic Deprivation
Applying Penn Central's economic factors to determine the validity
of a regulation more readily suggests that Wrigley Field is a regulatory
taking. In Penn Central, part of the determination as to whether an
economic deprivation constituted a "taking" were factors such as whether
or not a physical invasion had occurred, whether the regulation resulted in a
complete economic deprivation, and whether the regulation interfered with
investment-backed expectations. 3 As later cases indicate, the strength of
217. See generally Talk of the Nation: Feud Between Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and
the Chicago Tribune over Wrigley Field (National Public Radio radio broadcast Aug. 25, 2004)
(contending that Mayor Daley's actions regarding Wrigley Field are primarily motivated by
animosity toward the Tribune Company) (transcript on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review).
218. See Washburn, Cubs Still Hoping, supra note 39.
219. Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385-91 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834-37 (1987). But see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Inc., 526 U.S. 687,
702 (1999) (reiterating that the Court had yet to extend the "rough-proportionality test" from
Dolan and Nollan beyond exactions); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005)
(stating that the Agins' "substantially advancing state interests" test was not the driving force
behind the rulings in Nollan and Dolan, nor a stand-alone test for takings determinations).
220. But cf Kayden, supra note 117, at 783 (arguing to the contrary that Dolan and Nollan's
increased scrutiny will not make landmark preservation laws more difficult to uphold).
221. See Washburn, City Throws, supra note 41; Stuck on First Base, supra note 41.
222. Washburn, City Throws, supra note 41; Stuck on First Base, supra note 41; see also
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992) (stating that a bad faith action by the
government to unfairly single out and burden a single property owner constitutes an
unconstitutional taking).
223. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
LANDMARK STA TUS OF BASEBALL STADIUMS
the complete economic deprivation rule has wavered as the courts, while
still applying precedent, have begun to question the "parcel as a whole"
rule.224
The first factor of the Penn Central inquiry pertains to the character
of the government action, focusing on whether a physical invasion
occurred.225 For Wrigley Field, the discussion primarily focuses on the
burdensome regulation, rather than a distinct physical invasion.226 Yet the
facts indicate that a physical taking occurred,227 or at least lend support for
the Cubs in the "ad hoc" inquiry of the three factors.2 8
For instance, while facing reviews of the park for structural
soundness, city officials inspecting the foundation may have damaged the
park.229 Although the Seventh Circuit ruled that the denial of demolition
permits and prevention of physical development of the property under
Chicago landmark preservation laws did not constitute damage on its
own,230 an actual physical invasion by the City that constitutes damage to
the property would be a taking, no matter how minute.23'
Regarding the second aspect of economic effect, no party in the
dispute would claim that the landmark designation of Wrigley Field results
in a complete economic deprivation of the parcel as a whole. 232 However,
subsequent courts have been more willing to consider complete deprivation
of a segment of a parcel or, in the alternative, that a taking could occur
when the property as a whole suffers partial economic deprivation.233
224. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding
a partial taking when the government denied a group of builders development permits); The State
ex rel. R.T.G., Inc. v. Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1009 (Ohio 2002) (stating that the inability to mine
coal from the property, thus restricting profits, was a taking that withheld complete economic
value of the coal aspects of the property).
225. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
226. See, e.g., Spielman, Selig Delivers, supra note 3 (stating that landmark designation
"will likely precipitate the loss of Wrigley Field .... It will be the first step toward the ultimate
loss of the ballpark").
227. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982); see infra text accompanying notes 230-32.
228. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
229. Spielman, Cubs: City Damaged Wrigley, supra note 64.
230. See generally Int'l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating that the denial of permits to renovate landmarks alone is not "damage" equitable to a
taking); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-48.2-5 (2008).
231. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
232. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
233. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding
support for partial takings when the government denied a group of builders development
permits); The State ex rel R.T.G., Inc. v. Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1009 (Ohio 2002) ("Although
contiguous tracts of property are typically considered as a single relevant parcel for purposes of a
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Additionally, the Court contradicted itself by asserting that property is not
divisible in the sense that it looks to economic deprivation of the parcel as a
whole-however, the Court in Penn Central ruled that air rights are
divisible from the investment-backed property rights of the train station on
the ground.234 Thus, the loss in income due to many of the restrictions
placed on the stadium should be enough to be considered a taking.235
For instance, because of the inability for the Cubs to advertise on the
protected ivy-covered outfield walls, the team foregoes a significant source
of revenue every year that other stadiums in the league benefit from.
23 6
Naming rights are another example of a standard source of income for most
professional teams that the Cubs cannot benefit from. 237 Revenue from an
increased schedule of night games to a level equal to that of the rest of the
league would also allow the Cubs to become more financially
competitive. 8 Finally, because they are unable to freely alter the stadium,
the Cubs suffer from a restricted revenue stream from gate receipts since
the Cubs operate in one of the smallest parks in the league.239
takings analysis, factual nuances may dictate a more flexible approach. These factual nuances
may include the claimant's investment-backed expectations.") (citations omitted); see also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (stating that, "[a]ssuming a taking is
otherwise established, a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the premise that the
landowner is left with a token interest[,]" thereby enabling property owners to at least argue that
the court is willing to somewhat deviate from "complete" economic loss and that some economic
value alone is not sufficient).
234. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 64 (1985) (discussing the restriction on the use of airspace above the landmark
in Penn Central).
235. Compare MARTIN J. GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 299-314, 320-24, 334-49 (2d
ed. 2000) (providing examples of revenues that the Cubs are precluded from obtaining) with
Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d 1171 (showing support for partial takings) andR.T.G., 780 N.E.2d
998 and Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
236. GREENBERG, supra note 235, at 334-49.
237. Supra text accompanying notes 77-81; see, e.g., Podmolik, supra note 78.
238. See, e.g., Ballparks of Baseball-Attendance Figures,
http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/1980-89attendance.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008)
(displaying a 400,000-person increase at Wrigley Field from 1988 to 1989, the first full season
with night games and lights); Ballparks of Baseball-Attendance Figures,
http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/2000-03attendance.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008)
[hereinafter 2000s Attendance] (marking a slight increase in attendance when the team added four
additional night games, supra text accompanying note 58, even though ending 30 games under
.500 and playing markedly worse than the previous season). See also Wrigley Night Games,
supra note 58 ("The Cubs are the last major league team to play the majority of their 81 home
games in the afternoon .... The Cubs had been pushing for more night games, saying they
would generate more revenue."). Although not directly a result of the landmark designation, city
ordinances restrict the amount of night games that the Cubs are allowed to play due to the
residential location of Wrigley Field; the City uses its control over any adaptations of the park as
leverage in forcing its will upon the Cubs.
239. See 2000s Attendance, supra note 238 (showing that in 2003, when the Cubs were five
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In addition, if the Court extends the rules set forth in Nollan and
Dolan regarding exactions, the City of Chicago's stadium improvement
approval requirements become analogous to the requirements for the
easement and bike path in those respective cases. 240  In order to receive
approval to make changes, even in a reduced capacity, the City required the
Cubs to dedicate extensive financial resources to alleviate community
concerns regarding crime and traffic. 241 The City also required the Cubs to
broker an agreement with neighboring rooftop bleacher associations.242 An
extension of the Nollan and Dolan rules would not only expand the
argument regarding the extent and character of the government action, but
also acts as an additional drain on the financial situation of the Cubs and
the Tribune Company, and is thereby an economic deprivation. 43
Regarding investment-backed expectations, the Penn Central Court
noted that "the New York City law [did] not interfere in any way with the
present uses of the Terminal," and that, without the approval of the
proposed skyscraper, the use of the terminal could remain exactly the same
244as it had been for the previous sixty-five years. This is contrary to the
restrictions placed on Wrigley Field.245 The ballpark's ability to provide
baseball to the public remains the primary investment-backed expectation
of the Tribune Company; the landmarking hinders the ability of the Cubs to
host games in a suitably sized and maintained environment which affects
the return on the Tribune Company's investment. Additionally, the Penn
Central Court eliminated the need for the company to build above the
outs from the World Series, they were outdrawn by a Los Angeles Dodgers team who missed the
playoffs, but played in a much larger stadium). Additionally, the Cubs suffer from existing in a
dual-team market. Beyond the diehard fans, a casual fan merely taking in a baseball game is able
to find a suitable replacement product to the Cubs by attending a game of the cross town rival, the
White Sox. Even if similar demand existed, a higher supply of seats provided at the White Sox
game would lead to lower ticket prices. Since there is a higher amount of comparable seats
available, the casual baseball fan is drawn to a White Sox game. See generally Nate Silver, Lies,
Damned Lies: Neighborly Baseball, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, Apr. 12, 2006,
http://baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4965&mode=print&nocache= 1227634268
("[T]here is something of a substitution effect. That is, the commodity is not Dodger Baseball or
Angel Baseball, but Baseball, Period .... [T]he secondary team in a two-team market ... tends
to benefit more from the primary team doing well than the other way around .... The White Sox
benefit a bit when the Cubs are doing well because of the spillover effect from a crowded Wrigley
Field .... ).
240. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. But see cases cited supra note 219.
241. Wrigley Night Games, supra note 58.
242. Id.; Associated Press, Skybox on Waveland was Last Defendant, ESPN.COM, Apr. 9,
2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id= 1778748.
243. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
244. Id.
245. Spielman, Deal Struck, supra note 46.
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terminal when it acknowledged the company's ability to transfer air
development rights to neighboring buildings that Penn Central owned.246
Wrigley Field, however, cannot be developed in this way for two
reasons. First, the Tribune Company cannot transfer any rights because it
does not own other buildings in the surrounding neighborhood-even
property it thought it owned was "claimed" by the City during this
struggle.247  Second, even though Illinois and Chicago provide for
transferable development rights (TDRs) programs,248 zoning restrictions in
the residential neighborhood would likely bar any possible upward
expansion.2 49 These restrictions would bar expansion even if the team had
other properties, a significant distinction from the urban neighborhood of
Penn Central.250 These problems reflect issues regarding TDRs that some
commentators have discussed, issues that may arise in areas with multiple
sellers of TDRs, such as historic districts.251
To note, the decision in Palazzolo allows property owners who knew
of the burden of a landmark status before acquiring the property to
challenge the regulation as a taking. 252  This ability does not affect the
current owners of Wrigley Field, yet may help strengthen their case, and it
may be very important for the new owners when the property changes
hands. Additionally, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that
requiring an unwilling private party to bear all the expense of landmark
preservation is unconscionable, and forcing such parties "to spend
substantial sums of money to preserve landmark structures-with little or
no public assistance-could rise to the level of an unconstitutional
taking. 253  The court also feared that the stifling costs associated with
246. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137.
247. Washburn, City Throws, supra note 41.
248. See generally CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-120-850 (2008) (providing for TDRs in cases
of economic hardship on the landmarked owner); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-48.2.1 to 2.7 (2008)
(displaying Illinois extensive TDR program).
249. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 17.2-0311 (2008).
250. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136-37; see generally § 17.2-0311 (requiring height
restrictions in residential neighborhoods). But cf St. Bartholomew's Church v. The City of New
York, 914 F.2d 348, 357 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting an argument that while "in Penn Central[,] the
property owner continued to enjoy valuable, transferrable rights to develop the airspace above the
Terminal," the appealing property owner's development rights in the current case have lesser
value, although not completely eliminated).
251. See Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the
Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 897-99 (1984) (claiming that TDRs become
greatly devalued when the burdened property owner is unable or restricted from selling or
transferring the rights to contiguous parcels).
252. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 607 (2001).
253. Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. D.C. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev.,
432 A.2d 710, 718 (D.C. 1981) (echoing the Illinois Supreme Court's hesitation to force an
LANDMARK STATUS OF BASEBALL STADIUMS
landmark preservation could discourage parties from purchasing and
maintaining landmarks.254
As stated supra, the early history of the takings doctrine also provides
support for a devaluative regulatory taking.255 Even beyond the Supreme
Court's first decision regarding regulatory takings, preceding Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon by fifty years,256 early state decisions protected the
rights of owners who faced even a moderate devaluation of their
property.257  The cases decided before Penn Central that dealt with
landmarked properties also support the stance that landmarking Wrigley
Field would be a taking.258 These cases questioned the propriety of
protecting structures that were in disrepair and unusable under the
regulations, an argument that is applicable to Wrigley due to the poor
structural integrity of Wrigley Field.259
Additionally, "Maher indicated a requirement for the maintenance of
a historic building could raise an as-applied takings problem," a situation
that may present itself more and more as Wrigley Field ages.
260
Nonetheless, an argument for a devaluative taking must be based on the
assertion that the regulation affects the Cubs' ability to work with and
modify the parts of the stadium that the team already benefit from and
use. 261 The regulation has to affect the team's ability to use the stadium as
it currently stands and prevent it from being in complete disrepair. 62
Prospective advantages and profits do not hold weight on their own in
modem takings jurisprudence.263
The Supreme Court's use of the Penn Central analysis in coal mining
unwilling party to bear the burden of landmark preservation to a takings argument); see also Yee
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992) (reiterating the Supreme Court's hesitance to
label regulations as non-takings that completely devalue property and exist solely to unfairly
single out an owner to bear a public burden by themselves).
254. Rhodes Tavern, 432 A.2d at 718.
255. Supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
256. See sources cited supra note 104.
257. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165 (1859) (stating that even a cow grazing off
of a public highway onto private property as allowed by municipal license was a taking requiring
compensation).
258. See, e.g., Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974);
Illinois ex rel. Marbro Co. v. Ramsey, 171 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960).
259. See Lutheran Church, 316 N.E.2d 305; Marbro Co., 171 N.E.2d at 247-48; Washburn,
Wrigley Faces, supra note 60.
260. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 11-38 (5th ed. 2003).
261. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(showing the Court's refusal to frnd a taking when a landowner only loses prospective
advantages-in this case, the property rights above the terminal).
262. See generally id.
263. See generally id.
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taking cases is an appropriate analogy for landmarked stadiums. The Court
has historically been lenient in its regulatory takings jurisprudence, finding
takings through the same balancing test where others' claims have failed,
even in cases of partial takings or otherwise valid police power.2 64 Recent
takings cases have also given some support to coal miners claiming that
their property rights have been abrogated by regulations barring specific
mining on the property. 265  It seems that the investment-backed
expectations hold more weight in these situations, a standard that would be
appropriate for stadiums that exist as single-use facilities, discussed infra.
Under the standards set forth in Penn Central, in conjunction with the fact-
based inquiry the Penn Central Court encouraged, the designation of
Wrigley Field as a municipal landmark should be a regulatory taking, or at
least a partial taking, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.266
V. STADIUMS ARE UNIQUE AND REQUIRE COMPENSATION DESPITE
CURRENT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The Penn Central Court promoted factual, "ad hoc" inquiries into
what constituted a regulatory taking, refusing to set a strict rule.267 In
doing so, if an entity were able to make a case compelling enough based on
the facts, it could likely convince the Court of its entitlement to just
compensation outside the bounds of current regulatory takings
jurisprudence. As such, the issue of landmarking stadiums in a highly
264. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922). Although other similar
situations where the state exercised its police power were found to be valid, see, e.g., Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Court seemed to be more protective of the property rights
and investment-backed expectations of coal miners over other property owners. See Pa. Coal,
260 U.S. at 412-13. Even in attempts to quash a potential strike, government control over a coal
mine was a taking, contrary to other strike situations. U.S. v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114,
115-16 (1951).
265. See, e.g., R.T.G., Inc. v. Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1009 (Ohio 2002) (stating that
restrictions on coal mining were a taking because the only reason for the land purchase was
abrogated); Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 799 A.2d 751, 770 (Pa. 2002)
(remanding the case for determination of where the property boundaries were, while stating that
the coal in the area at issue had been rendered valueless). But see Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n., 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) (stating that the devaluation of coal was not severable from the
other aspects of the property).
266. See Chipchase, supra note 176, at 66-67 ("Where the economic impact is severe, but
short of a total deprivation of economically viable use, and the governmental action is either
extreme or poorly founded, the claimant should prevail without demonstrating interference with
investment-backed expectations. Conversely, where the economic impact is less pronounced and
the governmental action is reasonable and well purposed, a landowner will need to demonstrate
that the restriction truly frustrated well-defined plans and expenditures in order to succeed on her
claim.").
267. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
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unique industry should be considered a taking, based on the facts
surrounding professional baseball and stadiums, and independent from
previous precedent that weighs against such a finding.
The business of baseball has historically been looked at as a unique
entity by both the legislators and the judicial officers who have afforded
Major League Baseball an antitrust exemption found nowhere else in
American society.268 Some of the justifications for this special treatment
arise from the historical nature of the game.269 However, in many ways,
the industry is not a traditional economic market.270  Amusements,
generally seen as a luxury item, have a highly elastic demand, which
thereby makes them more subject to the demands of their fan base.271 As
such, their owners must be able to respond better to fans' wishes or risk
losing them; owners need to be fluid and able to adjust to meet the needs of
a fan base that demands the most state-of-the-art amenities and expects
their teams to keep up with others in the league.272 Additionally, as a place
of public assembly, baseball stadiums are subject to higher safety standards
than private residences or traditional businesses.273 For instance, the
dangerous situation of falling concrete' at Wrigley Field and the
bureaucratic mess in trying to remedy that situation are not challenges that
a landmarked private residence would likely face, or be so integral to its
274existence.
268. See Philip R. Bautista, Note, Congress Says, "'Yooou 're Out!!l" to the Antitrust
Exemption of Professional Baseball: A Discussion of the Current State of Player-Owner
Collective Bargaining and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 445, 450 (2000) (providing a history of baseball's antitrust exemption).
269. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972).
270. See id. at 282 ("[T]he aberration is an established one, and one that has been
recognized ... in ... a total of five consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberration that has
been with us now for half a century... and ... survived the Court's expanding concept of
interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique
characteristics and needs.").
271. See, e.g., John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports Facilities and
Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 105 (2000) (discussing the substitution effect that
occurs when a new stadium moves to town, which occurs conversely when the public becomes
dissatisfied by the stadium, and how the money becomes rearranged through the economy).
272. Spielman, Selig Delivers, supra note 3 ("[T]he designation... ignores the 'ever-
changing economics' of baseball .... 'Changes to Wrigley Field apparently will now be subject
to the subjective tastes and individual notions of designers, preservationists and community
leaders who cannot be expected to understand the competitive nuances of professional baseball,'
Selig said. 'Every change to Wrigley Field impacts both preservation issues and the ability of the
Cubs to field a winning team. If one favors preservation at the expense of operating
competitiveness, stadiums become albatross and are replaced."').
273. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4.156, 8.4 (2008).
274. Washburn, Wrigley Faces, supra note 60.
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Accordingly, a poor landmark designation can have a more drastic
effect on the sustainability of a stadium and a sports franchise than on other
properties, such as office buildings or train stations, that rely less on their
venue and more on the services they provide.275 The standards for
designation vary from community to community. This inconsistency can
lead to poor designations.276 Due to these lax standards, a large number of
buildings become designated and unusable, and thereby fall into disrepair
because they are unable to be destroyed or modified.2 7 These buildings
become huge financial burdens on their owners and often are abandoned,
which creates a negative urban value and detracts from the public worth
and aesthetic value.278 This result contradicts the landmark purposes
asserted in Penn Central.
279
Although the Wrigley Field case is the first attempt to protect a
280 lnmrbaseball stadium through landmark designation, poor landmark
designations have burdened stadiums before. 281 For instance, plans to build
a new stadium and revitalize downtown San Diego resulted in problems
with landmark preservationists, specifically regarding two buildings in the
proposed stadium district.
282
Following a settlement between the City of San Diego, preservation
groups, and the Padres, one of the buildings, the Western Metal Supply
Company building,283 was adaptively reused284 in the Petco Park design at a
burdensome cost of millions of dollars.285 The other building, the Showley
275. Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 271.
276. See, e.g., Associated Press, Dilapidated Denny's, supra note 188.
277. See, e.g., id.
278. Id.
279. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978).
280. Spielman, Selig Delivers, supra note 3 (quoting Commissioner Bud Selig stating, "No
city in America has ever used a landmarks designation as an effective means to preserve a
ballpark.").
281. See Jonathan Heller, Preservation Proves a Hit; 2 Historic Buildings Gaining Renewed
Leases on Life in Downtown Baseball Project, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 13, 2002, at B-I
[hereinafter Heller, Preservation Proves].
282. Id.
283. SAN DIEGO PADRES, SAN DIEGO PADRES 2007 MEDIA GUIDE 464 (2007), available at
http://pressbox.mlb.com/pressbox/downloads/y2007/sd/petco-park.pdf (stating the Western
Metal Supply Company building was protected because it had "ties to the Old West").
284. Adaptive reuse is the process of converting an old building that has been protected and
modify its features to make it suitable for use once again while still protecting the essential
historically significant features. See generally Lisa B. Goodman, Preserving Urban Estates: A
Case Study, 18 DEL. LAW. 8, 9 (2000) (discussing the adaptive reuse of some commercial or
industrial properties).
285. Heller, Preservation Proves, supra note 281; SAN DIEGO PADRES 2007 MEDIA GUIDE,
supra note 283, at 466; see also Suzy Hagstrom, A Ton of Bricks and Ten Pounds of Baloney,
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Brothers Candy Factory (Showley Factory), had to be lifted off the ground
and moved 280 feet away, also at a huge cost of $3 million and multiple
delays.286 The Showley Factory, which was slated for demolition in 2000,
had not been used as a candy factory since the 1950s.287  In fact, the
building was used as a warehouse and cheap housing in the deteriorating
downtown area until preservationists intervened and asked for protection
from demolition.288
Regardless of the questionable benefits and the costly remedies
afforded to the aforementioned historic structures,289 these methods are not
applicable to stadiums. 290  For instance, unlike a generic building with
distinct aesthetic qualities, such as one that can be converted into an office
or a restaurant, a stadium is a single-use structure that has no practical use
outside of being a stadium. 291 . The Western Metal Supply Company
building, which was an industrial building that was converted into rooftop
seating and a team store for Petco Park, is one example of a convertible
building.2 92 Furthermore, with respect to Wrigley Field, even if moving the
park in a manner similar to the Showley Factory were possible from an
engineering standpoint, it would still be fiscally impractical and physically
impossible given the neighborhood surrounding the park.293
For better or worse, sports teams and their stadiums are burdened by
local government at a variety of levels, so much so that some cities have
unsuccessfully tried to invoke eminent domain merely to prevent a team
from moving to a more profitable destination.294 Even beyond the political
SAN DIEGO WEEKLY READER, Oct. 7, 1999,
http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/1 999/oct/07/ton-bricks-and-ten-pounds-baloney/
(criticizing the agreement and its conservation effects).
286. Jonathan Heller, How Sweet It Is! Historic Candy Factory Off on Landmark Haul,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 23, 2003, at B-I [hereinafter Heller, How Sweet].
287. Heller, Preservation Proves, supra note 281; see also GREENBERG, supra note 235, at
569 ("This [urban renewal from Petco Park] will completely revitalize an extremely derelict part
of San Diego.").
288. Heller, Preservation Proves, supra note 281; see also GREENBERG, supra note 235, at
569 ("This [urban renewal from Petco Park] will completely revitalize an extremely derelict part
of San Diego.").
289. See Heller, Preservation Proves, supra note 281.
290. See Rosenthal, supra note 14 (explaining that Wrigley Field is a single-use type of
property).
291. See id. ("[Zell] acknowledged that Wrigley, because of its landmark status, is a tricky,
single-use piece of property. 'Unless they're going to let us build a couple of high-rises adjacent
to first, second and third [bases], it is somewhat a single-purpose structure,' Zell said. 'Wrigley
Field is just Wrigley Field."').
292. SAN DIEGO PADRES 2007 MEDIA GUIDE, supra note 283, at 464.
293. See generally Heller, How Sweet, supra note 286; supra text accompanying note 206.
294. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, MAY THE BEST TEAM WIN: BASEBALL ECONOMICS AND
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fighting over Wrigley Field, it is questionable why the landmarking of
stadiums is so directly tied to municipal governments295 when cities benefit
extensively from the economic effects of stadiums.296 For instance, even
though the proposed sale of Wrigley Field to the state likely signaled a
relaxing of the landmark designation for which Mayor Daley fought so
hard,297 Daley only jumped on board when he realized that a state-funded
renovation of the field could bring in millions of dollars of economic
growth and tax revenue for Chicago. 298 Additionally, a new stadium-and
most likely the renovation of an old one-redevelops the urban core when
299
placed in a downtown environment, as occurred in San Diego.
As discussed above, a stadium is beneficial for a city; it is also one of
the most critical economic aspects of professional sports ownership.3 °0
Historically, a majority of sports revenue comes from ticket sales and other
stadium-related income.30 1 Statistical data show that during the time period
after a team moves into a new stadium, when the quality of the stadium
experience generally improves, attendance increases by about six and a half
percent. 30 2 Additionally, signage and other in-stadium advertising, such as
naming rights, are a significant part of the economic benefits of stadium
and team ownership.30 3 It is wholly unfair for a municipality to take away
PUBLIC POLICY 140 (paperback ed. 2004) [hereinafter ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS]. The
threat of a move is much less likely with a team that exists in a large media market like Chicago.
This threat is often used to force public funding for a new stadium. Id. at 124; accord MICHAEL
LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 185 (2d ed. 2005).
295. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-120-580 (2008).
296. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 235, at 569; ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS,
supra note 294, at 130 (providing examples of municipal benefits to stadiums, urban
redevelopment in this case).
297. See Spielman, City Makes, supra note 1; Andrew Herrmann, State's Plan to Buy
Wrigley Lands It on Endangered List, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16.
298. See Kari Lydersen, Cheering News for the Cubs?; After Squabbles With Owners,
Mayor May Back Park's Sale, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2008, at A3 (stating that the mayor
understands the economic importance of the Cubs and that the assurance that a sale to the Illinois
Sports Facility Authority would not increase taxes to finance the renovation may have won over
the mayor).
299. See GREENBERG, supra note 235, at 569. Although Wrigley Field is not "downtown,"
the theory that the stadium's surrounding area benefits from government subsidies is likely
equitable to the surrounding businesses in the residential neighborhood of Lake View.
ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL ECONOMICS, supra note 294, at 130.
300. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE
BIG BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME, 50-51 (rev. ed. 1994).
301. See id.
302. RODNEY D. FORT, SPORTS ECONOMICS 385 (2d ed. 2006).
303. GREENBERG, supra note 235, at 299-314, 320-24, 334-49; FORT, supra note 302, at
78; LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 294, at 210 ("One can generally identify venues
belonging to the current era of sports facilities by the corporate names they bear."); Sterrett, supra
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such an important part of an owner's investment and control in the
property. Regulations that apply restrictions on a property owner should be
considered a taking regardless of a lack of neatly fitting standards.
VI. EFFECT OF LANDMARKING ON THE SALE OF THE CUBS AND
WRIGLEY FIELD
No court has determined that the City of Chicago's landmark
classification of Wrigley Field is a regulatory taking; therefore, any Cubs
and Wrigley Field sales will occur with the landmark designation in
place.30 4 This landmark designation will have an immediate effect on the
sale of Wrigley Field, in the sense that any potential sale will be discounted
based upon the buyer's knowledge that an estimated $400 million from
twenty years of naming rights is unavailable to the purchaser.3 °5 Still, as
long as the landmark law is valid, the Cubs and its suitors have no real
legal recourse regarding the situation. 30 6 The Court emphasized long ago
that the Fifth Amendment provides no compensation for an otherwise
lawful action, even when there is a consequential injury or an economic
depreciation that reduces the property's value to nearly nothing.30 7
A combined sale of the Cubs and Wrigley Field would effectively
require the new owners to stay at Wrigley Field for a long time and find a
way to renovate the property, lest they be left with an oversized, expensive
statue.30 8 Separately, the antiquated stadium carries little value without an
agreement from the new Cubs owner to remain in the stadium for the long
term. 309 Furthermore, the Cubs' popularity has historically been tied to
Wrigley Field; therefore, the team may lose some fans if it moves to a new
home.310 Indeed, the popularity of the two entities seems to be inextricably
tied together.311 However, if the team and stadium are sold separately and a
new team owner is willing to leave Wrigley Field-thereby alienating
note 79 ("Mr. Zell could fetch $5 to $6 million a year for naming rights to the park.").
304. See Moffett, supra note 45.
305. Spielman, Wrigley Deal, supra note 90.
306. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923).
307. Id.
308. Spielman, Wrigley Deal, supra note 90 (stating that any sale of the stadium to the State
would require the new Cubs owner to sign an ironclad thirty-year lease).
309. See Rosenthal, supra note 14 (stating that Wrigley Field is a single-use property, the
value of which implicitly would be greatly depreciated if its sole tenant departed).
310. See Tyler Heun, Fan Poll: What Are the Top 5 Stadiums in Major League Baseball,
BLEACHER REPORT, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/27912-fan-poll-what-are-the-top-5-
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some of the outspoken fan base3 1 2-a state-of-the-art facility with modem
amenities could offset that loss and provide greater revenue.
31 3
Nevertheless, the premise of selling the team and stadium separately has
upset some bidders, who prefer to control any possible Wrigley Field
overhaul and avoid being stuck with a lease.31 4
An economics professor who specializes in sports stadiums recently
stated, "'[a]t some point, Wrigley Field is going to fall down, be it
economically or physically... [a]nd a new owner [will have] to figure out
what they're going to do with it."' 315 Nevertheless, before the ultimate fate
of the landmark-designated ballpark can be determined, the Chicago Cubs
and Wrigley Field first must be sold.316 Recent discussions to sell the park
to the State of Illinois317 fell through,31 8 much to the relief of advocacy
groups, 319 the fans, and the community of "Wrigleyville., 320 Adding to the
312. See, e.g., Ed Koska, Letter to the Editor, Baseball's Cathedral, CHI. TRIB., May 21,
2005, at Commentary C23 (comparing a state-of-the-art facility with Wrigley Field, but still
preferring the "ancient cathedral"); see generally Associated Press, Illinois Governor Says Cubs
Should Play at Wrigley "Forever ", ESPN.coM, Mar. 27, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3316340 ("Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich said
Thursday he'll do all he can to keep the team playing at Wrigley Field as billionaire owner Sam
Zell looks to sell both the team and the ballpark.").
313. See generally Spielman, Selig Delivers, supra note 3 (stating Major League Baseball's
opposition to landmark designation because of stadiums needs to be fluid to change); see supra
text accompanying note 303.
314. Colias & Saphir, supra note 8 ("'There's no question this (stadium deal) would take
away some luster for bidders. . . ').
315. Wayne Drehs, New Owner Can Transform "Lovable Losers".., for $1 Billion,
ESPN.coM, Sept. 21, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3029964.
316. Editorial Note: During the production process, the Tribune Company picked the
Ricketts family as the winning bidders in its attempt to sell Wrigley field. The agreement
provides that the Cubs and Wrigley Field are to be sold together for approximately $900 million,
and will include a twenty-five percent stake in the regional cable network. Doug Miller, Tribune
Picks Winning Bidder For Cubs, MLB.COM, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090122&contentid=3764850&vkey=news_chc&fe
xt=.jsp&cid=chc.
317. Associated Press, Reports: Illinois Sports Agency in Talks with Cubs to Acquire
Wrigley Field, ESPN.COM, Dec. 13, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3153685.
318. Muskat, supra note 7.
319. Herrmann, supra note 297; see also Landmarks Illinois, A Special 1 th Designation
(2008), http://www.landmarks.org/ten-most_2008_11 .htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (making
special note of Wrigley Field and its possible state acquisition in the group's yearly list of the ten
most threatened Illinois sites).
320. Home Field Disadvantage, supra note 90; Editorial, Lights Out on a Bad Idea, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, June 11, 2008, at 29; Mike Cahill, Letter to the Editor, Nice Job Protecting Wrigley,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 19, 2008, at 24. Additionally, Wrigleyville residents opposing the
renovations by the Tribune Company would likely be no more reticent to the State's renovations
than the Tribune Company's renovations, especially now that the brokered deal with the Tribune
Company regarding the rooftop bleachers has continued to hold and the bleacher renovations
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furor, Barack Obama's election as President will likely slow the sales of
professional sports teams due to his proposed tax hikes. 32' Even though the
combined sale of the Cubs, Wrigley Field, and a partial stake of a cable
company could garner as much as $1 billion, Sam Zell and the Tribune
Company have a multitude of issues to resolve regarding the Cubs and
Wrigley Field.322
Still, Wrigley Field is not the only venue facing this issue,323 and the
debate regarding stadium designations will not disappear anytime soon.
324
Recently, Yankee Stadium, a place many regard as "the cathedral of
baseball," faced the wrecking ball,325 and despite its clear historic nature,
326was replaced with a billion-dollar stadium across the street. Many fans
questioned the destruction of over eighty years of history.327 This event
probably would not have occurred had the stadium been designated a
landmark. 328 Nonetheless, historian Patty Henry says the National Historic
Landmark Program had "'troubles with [Yankee Stadium]'s integrity.'
Landmark status would have protected Yankee Stadium from its planned
demolition .... But major renovations from 1974-75 drastically changed
have been completed without blocking their view. Associated Press, Wrigley Honored With
Landmark Preservation Award, ESPN.COM, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2578345; Associated Press, Cubs, Rooftop Club
Owner, supra note 211.
321. Lester Munson, Change Is Coming to Sports, Too, Under Obama, ESPN.COM, Nov. 5,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=3683722 ("Obama's campaign promises
about capital gains and inheritance taxes.., will complicate the sale and transfer of team
ownerships. Wayne Huizenga, the owner of the Miami Dolphins.... will attempt to complete
the sale of his team ... before the end of 2008 to avoid Obama's promised increase in the capital
gains tax.").
322. Wayne Drehs, New Owner Can Transform "Lovable Losers "...for $1 Billion,
ESPN.coM, Sept. 21, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/storyid=3029964.
323. Winnie Hu, Yankees Win, 44-3 and 45-2, as Council Approves Stadium, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2006, at BI.
324. See, e.g., John Jeansonne, And Somehow, This Shrine Is Not a Landmark, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 21, 2008, at H10.
325. See, e.g., Podmolik, supra note 78 ("'Yankee Stadium is the cathedral of baseball ... '
Randy Levine, the Yankees' president, said recently."); Jon Blau, Cathedral Leaves Lasting Mark
on Fans, MLB.COM, Sept. 21, 2008,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=2008092 l&contentid=3522722&vkey-newsnyy&fe
xt-.jsp&c-id-nyy ("For Yankees fans, every game of baseball at Yankee Stadium is like a
family gathering and a religious experience. The Cathedral has served as both their church and
home.").
326. Hu, supra note 323.
327. See, e.g., Andrew Wolf, Op-Ed, Save Yankee Stadium, N.Y. SUN, July 18, 2008, at
Opinion 6 (reflecting one fan's desire to save the ballpark).
328. Jeansonne, supra note 324 ("[T]he New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission, which could have stopped this year's scheduled tear-down of the 85-year old walls,
repeatedly has rejected landmark designation .... ").
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the stadium from the 1923 original and cost it historic significance. 329
Boston's Fenway Park, the oldest park among current Major League
Baseball venues, also has faced, and will continue to face, issues regarding
protection in the name of historic preservation. 330 However, in contrast to
the situation in Chicago, the Boston Red Sox were not subject to a battle
with its home city, and committed itself to a $200 million renovation of
Fenway Park before applying for National Historic Landmark status. 33'
While the pending designation may limit the Red Sox owners' flexibility
for future renovations, the team is committed to remaining in Fenway Park
and will likely be able to recoup much of its spending by making the major
renovations before the National Park Service designates Fenway Park as a
landmark.3 32 Additionally, by making the necessary renovations to keep
Fenway Park economically viable, the Red Sox's long-term commitment to
Fenway Park likely will enable it to benefit from increased input on how
the development unfolds in the high-traffic area surrounding the stadium in
downtown Boston.333 Finally, the owners of Fenway Park will still be able
to renovate an adjacent building located behind Fenway Park's centerfield
wall by adding stories that could accommodate hundreds of additional seats
on the roof (to allow a view similar to the rooftops surrounding Wrigley
Field, except owned by the team) and allow for more team office space,
enabling the team to increase stadium capacity in order to keep up with
other teams' facilities.334
By opting for renovation instead of a complete overhaul, the Red Sox
succeeded in balancing economic viability and historic preservation where
the Yankees could not.335 Likewise, the Red Sox applied that balance
toward an amicable partnership with the government in a way that the Cubs
could not.336 While the Red Sox's stock rises, the Cubs enter a sea of
uncertainty regarding its stadium, ownership, and place in Chicago.337 Just
329. Jane Lee, Preserving Sports Sites Difficult; Few Facilities Pursue Federal Landmark
Status, USA TODAY, July 26, 2007, at 3C.
330. News Services, Red Sox Seek Landmark Status for Fenway, WASH. POST, Aug. 25,
2005, at E6.
331. In contrast to Chicago's landmark preservation program, federal protection of Fenway
Park would make the Red Sox eligible to receive "rehabilitation tax credits," equaling a return of
roughly twenty percent of any expenditures to rehabilitate historic structures. Chris Reidy, Sox




335. Jeansonne, supra note 324.
336. Reidy, supra note 331.
337. See generally Associated Press, Bidders, supra note 88 (stating the progress of the sale
of the Cubs and Wrigley Field).
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like on the field,3 38 the Cubs are a victim of unfortunate circumstances
preventing the team's attempts to stay competitive-economically or
otherwise-with the rest of the franchises in Major League Baseball-
compliments of the City of Chicago's preservationist proclivities.
Bryan Steinkohl*
338. The Chicago Cubs will enter the 2009 season without winning a World Series title in
100 years or a National League pennant since 1945. It is the opinion of some members of the
public that this drought can be attributed to a curse on the Cubs that has led to a variety of
miscues and failures on behalf of the team. Tom Van Riper, Curses! 13 Super Sports
Superstitions, FORBES.COM, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/15/sports-baseball-
soccer-biz-sports cx-tvr 0415superstitions.html.
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